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THE PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATION AND THE
INSURABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, punitive damages' have been assessed against corpora-
tions with increasing frequency2 and in increased amounts.3 Punitive
1. Punitive damages are awarded in addition to compensatory damages. Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 908 (1977). They are awarded if a tort is accompanied by
sufficiently aggravating or outrageous conduct. See Miller Pipeline Corp. v. Broeker, -
Ind. App. -, -, 460 N.E.2d 177, 184 (1984); D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of
Remedies § 3.9, at 205 (1973); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser &
Keeton on Torts § 2, at 9-11 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Prosser and Keeton].
They are intended to aid society's interest in preventing wrongful behavior. See Gorman
v. Saf-T-Mate, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 1028, 1037 (N.D. Ind. 1981); Nicholson v. American
Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Lazenby v. Uni-
versal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 646, 383 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1964); Campen v.
Stone, 635 P.2d 1121, 1123 (Wyo. 1981). Punitive damages are thought to promote the
attorney general type of suit when the plaintiff's actual recovery is not worth the cost of
litigation, but the defendant's behavior should nonetheless be deterred. See Thiry v. Arm-
strong World Indus., 661 P.2d 515, 518 (Okla. 1983); State ex rel Young v. Crookham,
290 Or. 61, 68, 618 P.2d 1268, 1272 (1980); Crane, Commentary: Due Process Considera-
tions in the Imposition of Corporate Liability, 1 N. Ill. U.L. Rev. 39, 43-44 (1980); Com-
ment, Punitive Damages for Securities Regulation, 8 Hous. L. Rev. 137, 149 (1970). The
prospect of punitive damages, which offers the possibility of a reward for time and effort,
is thought to encourage the plaintiff to bring his suit. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119
Cal. App. 3d 757, 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 383 (1981); Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho
702, 708, 496 P.2d 939, 945 (1972); C. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages
276-77 (1935); Crane, supra, at 43-44; Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Liti-
gation, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 1257, 1285 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Owen I].
2. Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 100 IMl. App. 3d 1102, 1114, 427 N.E.2d 608,
616-17 (1981); see DuBois, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury, Products Liability and
Professional Malpractice Cases: Bonanza or Disaster, 43 Ins. Couns. J. 344, 345-46 (1976);
Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages" A Com-
ment, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 133, 133 (1982); Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litiga-
tion: Addressing the Problems of Fairness Efficiency, and Control, 52 Fordham L. Rev.
37, 37 (1983); Symposium Discussion: Punitive Damages, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 155, 160
(1982) (statement of Malcolm E. Wheeler, Professor of Law, University of Kansas School
of Law); Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures,
69 Va. L. Rev. 269, 271 & n.6 (1983); More punitive damage awards, Bus. Wk., Jan. 12,
1981, at 86. This increase cannot be explained by changes in the law or in the standards
of conduct needed to justify a punitive damage award. DuBois, supra, at 346; Priest,
Punitive Damages and Enterprise Liability, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 123, 123-24 (1982).
3. Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 100 IM. App. 3d 1102, 1114, 427 N.E.2d 608,
616-17 (1981); DuBois, supra note 2, at 346; Wheeler, supra note 2, at 271; Taylor, Prod-
uct Liability: The New Morass, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1985, § 3, at 1, col. 2, at 8, cols. 2-3
[hereinafter cited as Product Liability], see, e.g., Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
691 F.2d 811, 813 (6th Cir. 1982) ($500,000 award against asbestos manufacturer); Chuy
v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1279 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc)
($60,590.96 punitive damage award to player against club whose doctor falsely told a
reporter that player had fatal disease); Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 595 F. Supp. 171, 172-73 (M.D. Fla. 1984) (affirming $300,000 award against
brokerage house accused of "churning" plaintiff's account); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor
Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 821-23, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 389, 391 (1981) (affirming the
reduction of $125 million purtitive damages award against auto manufacturer to S3.5
million); Rosener v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 754, 757, 168 Cal.
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damages are being awarded for causes of action for which they were for-
merly rare or non-existent.' What is more, it is possible that conduct
leading to a punitive damage award against a corporation has injured not
only the plaintiff, but hundreds and perhaps hundreds of thousands of
others.' Whether these damages should be insurable, however, has sel-
dom been considered within the context of their effect on a corporation.
In most jurisdictions, punitive damages are awarded to punish the de-
fendant and to deter him and others from engaging in the disapproved
conduct.' Almost all courts agree that insurance cannot protect a de-
Rptr. 237, 243, 247 (1980) (court vacated $10 million award for fraud and breach of
contract and ordered new trial on issue of damages unless plaintiff consented to a reduc-
tion to $2.5 million), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 1051 (1981); Jury Awards Surgeon's Kin
Over $8 Million From Insurer, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1984, § 1, at 68, col. 1 ($8 million
awarded against insurance company for failure to honor policy terms).
4. Skyline Harvestore Sys. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 331 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Iowa 1983);
see, e.g., Wills v. Trans World Airlines, 200 F. Supp. 360, 367 (S.D. Cal. 1961) (allowing
punitive damages under Civil Aeronautics Act for passenger bumped from overbooked
flight); Vernon Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, 607-09, 349 N.E.2d 173,
179-80 (1976) (allowing punitive damages for breach of contract if "the public interest
will be served by the deterrent effect punitive damages will have," without traditional
requirement of independent tort) (emphasis omitted); Priest, supra note 2, at 124 (in-
crease in success of private antitrust suits); Riders Win Suit Against Conrail in Westches-
ter, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1984, § 1, at 27, col. 6. (commuters awarded punitive damages
for bad service).
5. Prosser and Keeton, supra note 1, § 2, at 14; see Kreindler, Punitive Damages in
Aviation Litigation-An Essay, 8 Cum. L. Rev. 607, 608 (1978); Seltzer, supra note 2, at
40; cf Globus v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285 (2d Cir. 1969) (misstate-
ment in prospectus will harm most people who read it), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970);
Parker v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 109 Misc. 2d 678, 679, 440 N.Y.S.2d 964, 965 (Sup. Ct.
1981) (suit arising from explosion and gas leak in building managed by plaintiff).
6. Prosser and Keeton, supra note 1, § 2, at 9; see, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Hart-
ford Accident & Indem. Co., 420 F. Supp. 92, 95 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Providence Wash.
Ins. Co. v. City of Valdez, 684 P.2d 861, 863 (Alaska 1984); Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v.
Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 17, 39 P.2d 776, 779 (1934); Beaver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 95 111.
App. 3d 1122, 1123, 420 N.E.2d 1058, 1059 (1981); Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858,
865 (Iowa 1983); Continental Ins. Cos. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146, 151 (Ky. 1973);
Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Padavan v. Clemente, 43 A.D.2d
729, 730, 350 N.Y.S.2d 694, 697 (1973) (mem.); Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155, 1160 (Okla. 1980); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279
Or. 199, 205, 567 P.2d 1013, 1015 (1977) (en banc); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super.
200, 212, 224 A.2d 793, 799 (1966); Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 204, 139 S.E.2d
908, 910 (1965); Booth v. Kirk, 53 Tenn. App. 139, 149, 381 S.W.2d 312, 317 (1963);
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 682 P.2d 975, 978 (Wyo. 1984). In a
number of states punitive damages also have a compensatory element. See Ellis v. Gol-
conda Corp., 352 So. 2d 1221, 1225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Kesler v. Rogers, 542
P.2d 354, 359 (Utah 1975); Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227, 233 (W. Va. 1981).
The goal is to compensate the plaintiff for the cost to him, in both time and money, of the
lawsuit, as well as for other injuries "too remote to be considered under actual damages."
Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Hardy, 370 S.W.2d 904, 908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); see
Battle v. Kilcrease, 54 Ga. App. 808, 810, 189 S.E. 573, 574 (1936); see also D. Dobbs,
supra note 1, § 3.9, at 215 (compensatory award may not be sufficient to cover litigation
costs). In a few states, compensation is the" only goal of punitive damages. See Lanese v.
Carlson, 32 Conn. Supp. 163, 167, 344 A.2d 361, 364 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1975); Veselenak
v. Smith, 414 Mich. 567, 573, 327 N.W.2d 261, 264 (1982); Vratsenes v. New Hampshire
Auto Inc., 112 N.H. 71, 73, 289 A.2d 66, 68 (1972). But see Spokane Truck & Dray Co.
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fendant from punitive damages arising out of intentional wrongdoing,7
but whether public policy should prohibit him from shifting his burden
to the insurance company when punitive damages are assessed for reck-
less or grossly negligent actions has been a source of controversy for both
courts and commentators.
The cases that oppose insurability,' of which Northwestern National
Casualty Company v. McNulty9 is the bellwether,"° argue that insurance
vitiates the goals of punitive damages"I and that no individual should be
able to insulate himself from the consequences of his actions.' 2 Public
v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 52-53, 25 P. 1072, 1074 (1891) ("There is nothing stinted in the
rule of compensation. . . [I]t enters the domain of feeling, tenderly inquires into [the
plaintiff's] mental sufferings, and pays him for any anguish of mind that he may have
experienced. Indignities received, insults borne, sense of shame or humiliation endured,
lacerations of feelings, disfiguration, loss of reputation or social position, loss of honor,
impairment of credit, and every actual loss, and some which frequently border on the
imaginary, are paid for under the rule of compensatory damages.")
7. Farbstein & Stillman, Insurance for the Commission of Intentional Torts, 20 Has-
tings L.J. 1219, 1245-46 (1969); Oshins, Should Punitive Damages Be Within the Coverage
of Liability Insurance, 5 Forum 78, 83 (1969); see General Casualty Co. v. Woodby, 238
F.2d 452, 457-58 (6th Cir. 1956); Morrison v. Hugger, 369 So. 2d 614, 615 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979); Continental Ins. Cos. N. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146, 151-52 (Ky. 1974); Hens-
ley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227, 230 (W. Va. 1981).
8. See, e.g., Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 157, 642 P.2d 1305, 1310,
181 Cal. Rptr. 784, 789 (1982) (en banc); Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo.
10, 17, 39 P.2d 776, 779 (1934); Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533, 537,
18 A.2d 357, 359 (1941); U.S. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Fla.
1983); Guarantee Abstract & Title Co. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 228 Kan. 532,
535, 618 P.2d 1195, 1198 (1980); Braley v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 440 A.2d 359, 362
(Me. 1982); Wojciak v. Northern Package Corp., 310 N.W.2d 675, 680 (Minn. 1981);
Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v.
Gruhn, 99 Nev. 771, 773-74, 670 P.2d 941, 943 (1983) (per curiam); LoRocco v. NJ.
Mfrs. Indem. Ins. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 323, 332, 197 A.2d 591, 596 (1964); Parker v.
Agricultural Ins. Co., 109 Misc. 2d 678, 680-81, 440 N.Y.S.2d 964, 966 (Sup. Ct. 1981);
Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155, 1160 (Okla.
1980); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 212, 224 A.2d 793, 799 (1966). Many
commentators also oppose allowing insurance for punitive damages. See, e.g., Ellis, Fair-
ness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 71-76 (1982);
Haskell, Punitive Damages: The Public Policy and the Insurance Policy, 58 I1. BJ. 780,
790 (1970); Owen I, supra note 1, at 1308; Note, Insurance Coverage of Punitive Damages,
84 Dick. L. Rev. 221, 221 (1979); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70
Harv. L. Rev. 517, 527 (1957).
9. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
10. Beaver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 95 Ill. App. 3d 1122, 1124, 420 N.E.2d 1058,
1060 (1981); First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 233, 389 A.2d 359,
362 (1978); Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155, 1159
(Okla. 1980); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 682 P.2d 975, 979 (Wyo.
1984).
11. See Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 158, 642 P.2d 1305, 1311, 181
Cal. Rptr. 784, 790 (1982) (en banc); U.S. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So. 2d 1061,
1064 (Fla. 1983); Crll v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); New Hampshire
Ins. Co. v. Gruhn, 99 Nev. 771, 773-74, 670 P.2d 941, 943 (1983) (per curiam).
12. See Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. CL App. 1964); New Hampshire Ins.
Co. v. Grubn, 99 Nev. 771, 773-74, 670 P.2d 941, 943 (1983) (per curiam); Parker v.
Agricultural Ins. Co., 109 Misc. 2d 678, 680-81, 440 N.Y.S.2d 964, 966 (Sup. Ct. 1981);
Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 212, 224 A.2d 793, 799 (1966).
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policy "would seem to require that the damages rest ultimately as well
[as] nominally on the party actually responsible for the wrong. If that
person were permitted to shift the burden to an insurance company, pu-
nitive damages would serve no useful purpose."' 3 Some courts further
assert that if punitive damage awards were covered by insurance, the in-
surance company would pass on its liability to the public by raising its
premiums.14 Just as it is pointless to punish the insurance company for
the insured's wrongdoing,15 it is wrong that the fine should pass to the
public for whose benefit it is imposed. 6
The leading case supporting insurability' 7 is Lazenby v. Universal Un-
13. Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1962);
see, e.g., U.S. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Fla. 1983); Braley v.
Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 440 A.2d 359, 362 (Me. 1982); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23
(Mo. Ct. App. 1964); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Gruhn, 99 Nev. 771, 773-74, 670 P.2d
941, 943 (1983) (per curiam); Variety Farms, Inc. v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 172 N.J.
Super. 10, 25, 410 A.2d 696, 703 (1980); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 212, 224
A.2d 793, 799 (1966).
14. See Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440-41 (5th Cir.
1962); Wojciak v. Northern Package Corp., 310 N.W.2d 675, 680 (Minn. 1981) (quoting
McNulty, 307 F.2d at 440-41); Variety Farms, Inc. v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 172 N.J.
Super. 10, 25, 410 A.2d 696, 703 (1980) (same). But see Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
279 Or. 199, 212-14, 567 P.2d 1013, 1019-20 (1977) (en bane) (other insurance holders
similarly protected, not the public, create fund that pays punitive damage award).
15. Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1962);
Wojciak v. Northern Package Corp., 310 N.W.2d 675, 680 (Minn. 1981) (quoting Mc-
Nulty, 307 F.2d at 440-41); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964). Con-
tra Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 213, 567 P.2d 1013, 1019-20 (1977) (en
banc) (punitive damages against company not punishment, but business risk).
16. Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440-41 (5th Cir.
1962); Braley v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 440 A.2d 359, 362 (Me. 1982) (quoting Mc-
Nulty, 307 F.2d at 440-41); Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621
P.2d 1155, 1159-60 (Okla. 1980).
17. E.g., Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 488, 502 P.2d 522,
525 (1972) (en banc); California Union Ins. Co. v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 264 Ark. 449,
453, 572 S.W.2d 393, 395 (1978); Greenwood Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
238 Ga. 313, 316-17, 232 S.E.2d 910, 913-14 (1977) (per curiam); Abbie Uriguen Olds-
mobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 507, 511 P.2d 783, 789
(1973); Skyline Harvestore Sys. Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 331 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Iowa
1983); Continental Ins. Cos. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146, 151-52 (Ky. 1973); First Nat'l
Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 229, 389 A.2d 359, 360 (1978); Vigilant
Ins. Co. v. Kambly, 114 Mich. App. 683, 687-88, 319 N.W.2d 382, 385 (1982); Anthony
v. Frith, 394 So. 2d 867, 868 (Miss. 1981); First Bank (N.A.)-Billings v. Transamerica
Ins. Co., - Mont. -, -, 679 P.2d 1217, 1223 (1984); Wolff v. General Casualty Co., 68
N.M. 292, 298, 361 P.2d 330, 335 (1961); Mazza v. Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 311 N.C. 621,
-, 319 S.E.2d 217, 220-21 (1984); Morrell v. Lalonde, 45 R.I. 112, 118, 120 A. 435, 438
(1923), error dismissed per curiam, 264 U.S. 572 (1924); Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C.
200, 205, 139 S.E.2d 908, 910 (1965); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214
Tenn. 639, 647, 383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1964); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren,
477 S.W.2d 341, 342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); State v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 137 Vt. 313,
319, 404 A.2d 101, 105 (1979); Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227, 233 (W. Va.
1981); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 682 P.2d 975, 981 (Wyo. 1984); see
also Lambert, Does Liability Insurance Cover Punitive Damages?, 1966 Ins. L.J. 75, 75
(advocating insurance for punitive damages); Lentz, Payment of Punitive Damages by
Insurance Companies, 15 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 313, 320-21 (1966) (same).
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derwriters Insurance Co."8 Some of the courts that support insurability
are reluctant to decide issues on the basis of public policy, 9 and prefer to
leave the issue to be decided by the legislature.' Others assert that in-
surance is not contrary to public policy, because it does not tend to make
undesirable conduct more likely.21 Many courts argue that there is no
evidence that prohibiting insurance has a deterrent effect.'
This Note argues that insurance of punitive damages assessed against
publicly held corporations should be allowed, because the arguments op-
posing insurance are largely irrelevant in that context. Whatever puni-
tive and deterrent value there is will be largely unaffected by allowing
insurance; what diminished efficacy results is counterbalanced by the
need to protect corporations and their shareholders from the effect of
possibly arbitrary and excessive punitive damage awards.
Part I examines the dangers ihat arise from allowing punitive damage
awards against corporations. It concludes that the difficulties posed by
their imposition are alleviated by allowing insurance. Part II examines
the policies against insurance in the context of the publicly-owned corpo-
ration and concludes that the main goals of prohibiting insurance-de-
terring wrongdoing and preventing the wrongdoer from passing on his
punishment-are not enhanced by prohibiting the insurance of punitive
damages assessed against corporations, because other factors unique to
the corporation accomplish these goals.
18. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
19. See First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 238, 389 A.2d 359,
364 (1978); Mazza v. Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 311 N.C. 621, -, 319 S.E.2d 217, 221
(1984); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 682 P.2d 975, 979 (%Vyo. 1984); see
also Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306 (1930) ("(Plublic policy. . . should be
accepted as the basis of a judicial determination, if at all, only with the utmost circum-
spection. The public policy of one generation may not, under changed conditions, be the
public policy of another."); Lazenby, 214 Tenn. at 648, 383 S.W.2d at 5 ("Public policy is
the present concept of public welfare or general good.").
20. See First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 239, 389 A.2d 359,
365 (1978); see also Lerner v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 219 Va. 101, 103, 245 S.E.2d 249,
251 (1978) 0eaving the issue to be decided by the legislature).
21. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191, 195 (6th Cir. 1943); Mazza
v. Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 311 N.C. 621, -, 319 S.E.2d 217, 221 (1984); Harrell v. Trav-
elers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 207-08, 567 P.2d 1013, 1017 (1977) (en banc); Hensley v.
Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227, 232 (%V. Va. 1981); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia Casualty
Co., 682 P.2d 975, 981 (,Vyo. 1984).
22. See Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 487, 502 P.2d 522,
524 (1972) (en banc); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 208, 567 P.2d 1013,
1017 (1977) (en banc); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 647,
383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1964); State v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 137 Vt. 313, 319-20, 404 A.2d 101,
105 (1979); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 682 P.2d 975, 981 (Vyo. 1984).
But see American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523, 527 (10th Cir. 1966) (Punitive damages
cannot possibly deter unless the wrongdoer is forced to pay them; "we may as well say
criminal sanctions serve no useful purpose just because they are constantly violated.").
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I. THE DANGERS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES ASSESSED
AGAINST CORPORATIONS
Punitive damages have always been a source of controversy for both
courts and commentators. Four states prohibit punitive damages.23
Some judges have acknowledged the criticisms but have nevertheless felt
bound to impose them.24 One court noted that "the doctrine is too
deeply implanted in the law to be uprooted for no better reason than that
it is illogical. ' 25 There are many arguments against punitive damages, 2
6
but it is the practical difficulties that are of concern to the corporation.
The major problems are the uncertainty of the imposition of punitive
damages27 and the difficulty of controlling the size of the awards, 28 be-
cause whether punitive damages are awarded at all, and the amount of
the award are matters left almost entirely to the discretion-some might
say whim-of the jury.2 9 This is of particular significance to corpora-
23. See City of Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 257, 269, 47
N.E.2d 265, 272 (1943) (punitive damages prohibited unless authorized by statute);
Miller v. Kingsley, 194 Neb. 123, 124, 230 N.W.2d 472, 474 (1975) (punitive damages
prohibited); Bruton v. Leavitt Stores Corp., 87 N.H. 304, 305, 179 A. 185, 186 (1935)
(same); Anderson v. Dalton, 40 Wash. 2d 894, 898, 246 P.2d 853, 855 (1952) (en banc)
(punitive damages prohibited unless authorized by statute).
24. See Miller Pipeline Corp. v. Broeker, - Ind. App. -, -, 460 N.E.2d 177, 185
(1984); Continental Ins. Cos. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146, 152 (Ky. 1973); Goddard v.
Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 220-21 (1869); see also Long, Punitive Damages: An Un-
settled Doctrine, 25 Drake L. Rev. 870, 888-89 (1976) (punitive damages should be, but
will not be, eliminated) [hereinafter cited as Long I]; Long, Insurance Protection Against
Punitive Damages, 32 Tenn. L. Rev. 573, 580 (1965) (same); Comment, Factors Affecting
Punitive Damages, 7 Miami L.Q. 517, 523 (1953) (punitive damages should be
eliminated).
25. Schmidt v. Minor, 150 Minn. 236, 240, 184 N.W. 964, 966 (1921).
26. It is argued that exposing a defendant to both civil and criminal penalties creates
the risk of double jeopardy. See C. McCormick, supra note 1, § 77, at 276; Schwartz,
supra note 2, at 145; Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal
of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1158, 1181 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Reap-
praisal]. In addition, the defendant in a punitive damages action does not have the safe-
guards of a criminal trial. Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 49, 25 P.
1072, 1074 (1891); D. Dobbs, supra note 1, § 3.9, at 219; C. McCormick, supra note 1,
§ 77, at 276; Brandwen, Punitive-Exemplary Damages in Labor Relations Litigation, 29
U. Chi. L. Rev. 460, 468 (1962); Reappraisal, supra, at 1180. Further, the plaintiff re-
ceives a windfall. Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 53, 25 P. 1072, 1074
(1891); Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227, 233 (W. Va. 1981). Because he pockets
the award, it is in his best interest to ensure that the defendant is given the heaviest
penalty possible, not necessarily the exact amount necessary to punish and deter. Du-
Bois, supra note 2, at 350; Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 Harv. L. Rev.
1173, 1178 (1931).
27. See Ellis, supra note 8, at 38-39. See infra notes 77-91 and accompanying text.
28. See Ellis, supra note 8, at 56. See infra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), af'd, 223 F.2d
429 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955); Brause v. Brause, 190 Iowa 329, 339, 177
N.W. 65, 70 (1920); Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 207 (1869); Sandifer Oil
Co. v. Dew, 220 Miss. 609, 624, 71 So. 2d 752, 756 (1954) (quoting Mississippi Cent.
R.R. v. Hardy, 88 Miss. 732, 752, 41 So. 505, 510 (1906)); Booth v. Kirk, 381 S.W.2d
312, 317 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964). The lack of guidance given to the jury has concerned
courts and commentators. See Moore v. Remington Arms, 100 Il. App. 3d 1102, 1114-
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tions: It is feared that a jury is more likely to award large damages
against a corporation in favor of an individual than to award them
against one individual in favor of another.3°
A. The Rise of Enterprise Liability and the Possibility
of Excessive Punishment
One commentator, George Priest, has stated that the increased ten-
dency of juries to award punitive damages against corporations is in part
a result of the rise of the theory of enterprise liability-the idea that a
"corporate enterprise ought to be responsible for injuries caused by prod-
ucts that it places in commerce or for losses suffered from the pursuit of
its commercial interests."'" Priest suggests that enterprise liability theory
explains the increase in punitive damage judgments for business practices
as well as for products liability, and that it also underlies the doctrine of
strict liability.3 2 With this trend comes the risk of deterring certain ac-
tions more than is economically efficient.33
"'Efficiency' means exploiting economic resources in such a way that
'value'-human satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willing-
ness to pay for goods and services-is maximized."' If a product's price
accurately reflects the investment in safeguards, consumers will buy it as
long as the price is less than or equal to its value to them. "'If we make
a product too expensive. . . people will just switch to a more hazardous
product.' ,,' Thus, because it can be argued that corporate misconduct
should be deterred only to the point at which the damages assessed are
equal to the injury caused, so that the price of a product or service accu-
rately reflects the cost of injury, punitive damages can be considered to
be economically inefficient.36 When behavior is discouraged through the
15, 427 N.E.2d 608, 617 (1981); Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 54-
55, 25 P. 1072, 1074 (1891); C. McCormick, supra note I, § 77, at 276; Brandwen, supra
note 26, at 466-68; Long I, supra note 24, at 885.
30. Coffee, Making the Punishment Fit the Corporation. The Problems of Finding an
Optimal Corporation Criminal Sanction, 1 N. 111. U.L. Rev. 3, 20 (1980); Note, Inconsis-
tent Verdicts in Civil Trials, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1230, 1230-31 (1932).
31. Priest, supra note 2, at 124. The idea behind enterprise liability is that "it may
seem fairer to make the enterprise bear the burden in preference to either the outsider
who has been harmed or to the particular agents whose acts were most closely linked
with the injury, but which were performed under the direction, and for the benefit, of the
corporation." Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Con-
duct, 90 Yale L.J. 1, 13 (1980) (footnotes omitted); see Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499, 500-01 (1961).
32. See Priest, supra note 2, at 124 & n.9.
33. See C. Stone, Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behavior 31-
32 (1975).
34. R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 10 (2d ed. 1977) (emphasis in original).
35. G. Sullivan, Products Liability: Who Needs It? 27 (1979) (quoting Richard 0.
Simpson, Chairman, Consumer Product Safety Commission).
36. See Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 553 F. Supp. 482, 484 (D.NJ. 1982); C.
Stone, supra note 33, at 31-32; Calabresi, supra note 31, at 533-34.
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imposition of punitive damages, there exists the risk of deterring certain
actions beyond the point of economic efficiency.
B. The Inadequacy of Controls Over Awards
The danger that excessive damages will be imposed is increased by the
importance of the jury's role in determining whether punitive damages
will be assessed. Juries may tend to award large damages against a cor-
poration because many people have a certain mistrust of companies, 37
and juries tend to be unsympathetic to a corporate defendant accused of
injuring an individual.3 8  Also, a punitive damage claim enables the
plaintiff to introduce evidence of the company's worth.39 Once that evi-
dence is introduced, it may become more likely that the jury will award
punitive damages: A jury may feel that any entity with such wealth de-
serves to pay more than mere compensation for injuries it causes.40
Even if a jury is not swayed by the sheer wealth of a corporation, it is
very difficult for a jury to understand the relevant financial factors.4 ' A
juror is unlikely to have extensive experience with corporate finance and
will probably be unaccustomed to thinking in terms of the enormous
sums involved.42 "[A] typical juror may well be receptive to an argu-
37. Miller, A Modest Proposal for Helping to Tame the Corporate Beast, 8 Hofstra L.
Rev. 79, 80 (1979); Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufactur-
ers of Defective Products, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Owen II];
Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means Reconsid-
ered, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 388, 390 (1977). In a 1985 New York Times/CBS News Poll,
only 32% of those surveyed thought that most corporate executives are honest. Low
Marks for Executive Honesty, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1985, § 3, at 1, col. 2. A 1979 ABC
News/Harris Poll found that only 18% of those surveyed had confidence in leaders of
major corporations, down from 55% in 1966. Confidence Rollercoaster, Public Opinion,
Oct./Nov. 1979, at 30. A 1979 survey by Yankelovich, Skelly and White showed that
52% of those surveyed felt that "fbjusiness is only concerned with profits and not with
the interests of the public." Egging the Golden Goose, Public Opinion, April/May 1980,
at 29. A 1978 survey by the Roper Organization found that 68% of people surveyed
answered "largely true" to the statement "American business and industry has lost sight
of human values in the interest of profits." On the Debit Side, Public Opinion, April/
May 1980, at 24.
38. Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 100 IIl. App. 3d 1102, 1113, 427 N.E.2d 608, 616
(1981); Owen II, supra note 37, at 11.
39. See, e.g., Rosener v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 750, 168 Cal,
Rptr. 237, 243 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 1051 (1981); Beck v. Dowell, 111 Mo.
506, 513, 20 S.W. 209, 210 (1892); Fuchs v. Kupper, 22 Wis. 2d 107, 111, 125 N.W.2d
360, 363 (1963); Lewin, Punitive Costs: Insurance Issue, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1984, at
B2, col. 1, col. 3 (quoting Victor Schwartz, products liability lawyer). But see Hensley v.
Paul Miller Ford, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Ky. 1974) (disallowing evidence of wealth).
40. See DuBois, supra note 2, at 351. Introduction of the corporation's net worth
may also influence the jury in its award of compensatory damages. Lewin, supra note 39,
at B2, col. 1, col. 3 (quoting Victor Schwartz, products liability lawyer); see Long I, supra
note 24, at 885-86 (allowing evidence of the defendant's wealth for the purpose of deter-
mining punitive damages conflicts with the general rule prohibiting introduction of such
evidence).
41. Long I, supra note 24, at 885; Owen II, supra note 37, at 45.
42. Owen II, supra note 37, at 45-46. The inexperience of the jury in determining an
appropriate punitive damage award has been noted by a number of commentators. See,
1390 [Vol. 53
INSURABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
ment that anything less than $1 million would be but a drop in the
bucket. . ,,." A jury may assume that the numbers on a balance sheet
reflect liquid assets. Faced with a corporate balance sheet, it is unlikely
to understand fully that a substantial part of a corporation's net worth
will consist of inventory and other assets, rather than cash that can be
made readily available to satisfy a judgment.' Accordingly, a jury is
likely to find it very difficult to evaluate even expert testimony, and deter-
mine how much money will sting, but not cripple, the company.
The tendency of the jury to disfavor corporations is particularly dan-
gerous given its considerable discretion over the amount of punitive dam-
ages.4 5 Many states do not require any relationship between punitive and
compensatory damages," and even in those that do47 the standards are
applied flexibly.48 Although awards are subject to judicial review, courts
frequently are reluctant to tamper with jury decisions.49 In addition,
there is no reason to believe that the judge is more expert than the jury at
understanding balance sheets and determining the proper award to be
eg., Brandwen, supra note 26, at 467-68; Ellis, supra note 8, at 38; Long I, supra note 24,
at 885; Seltzer, supra note 2, at 49-50.
43. Owen II, supra note 37, at 20.
44. Owen II, supra note 37, at 19-20; see First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,
283 Md. 228, 241, 389 A.2d 359, 366 (1978).
45. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
46. See, eg., Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 662 (D.C. Cir.
1966) (en banc); Lassiter v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 349 So. 2d 622, 626
(Fla. 1977); Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 56 IlM. App. 3d 1102, 1113, 427 N.E.2d 608,
616 (1981); Unified School Dist. No. 490 v. Celotex Corp., 6 Kan. App. 2d 346, 356, 629
P.2d 196, 207 (1981); Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 759, 763 (Ky. 1974);
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Village of Hempstead, 48 N.Y.2d 218, 227 n. 15, 397
N.E.2d 737, 743 n. 15, 422 N.Y.S.2d 47, 53 n. 15 (1979); see also Pinckard v. Dunnavant,
281 Ala. 533, 538, 206 So. 2d 340, 344 (1968) (no relationship necessary unless award
shocks the conscience); Ray Dodge, Inc. v. Moore, 251 Ark. 1036, 1046, 479 S.W.2d 518,
524-25 (1972) (same); Malco, Inc. v. Midwest Aluminum Sales, Inc., 14 Wis. 2d 57, 66,
109 N.W.2d 516, 521 (1961) (relationship necessary in slander cases). Awards that have
been upheld in these jurisdictions include: Reynolds v. Pegler, 223 F.2d 429,431,434 (2d
Cir.) ($1 compensatory, $175,000 punitive), cert denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955); Unified
School Dist. No. 490 v. Celotex Corp., 6 Kan. App. 2d 346, 348, 629 P.2d 196, 201
(1981) ($100,000 compensatory, $600,000 punitive); Ford Motor Co. v. Nowak, 638
S.W.2d 582, 585 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982) ($400,000 compensatory, 84,000,000 punitive).
47. See, e.g., Shepard v. A.C. & S. Co., 484 A.2d 521, 525 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984);
Hughes v. Babcock, 349 Pa. 475, 481, 37 A.2d 351, 354 (1944); Kesler v. Rogers, 542
P.2d 354, 359 (Utah 1975).
48. Owen II, supra note 37, at 9. Some awards that have been upheld in these juris-
dictions include: Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1270, 1279
(3d Cir. 1979) (en bane) ($10,000 compensatory, $60,590.96 punitive); Oakes v. McCar-
thy, 267 Cal. App. 2d 231, 262-64, 73 Cal. Rptr. 127, 144-47 (1968) (S14,285 compensa-
tory, $59,300 punitive).
49. See, e-g., Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 223 F.2d
429 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955); Lassiter v. International Union of Oper-
ating Eng'rs, 349 So. 2d 622, 626-27 (Fla. 1977); Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me.
202, 227 (1869); Thomas v. Mickel, 214 Miss. 176, 188, 58 So. 2d 494, 497-98 VMiss.
1952) (quoting Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Williams, 87 Miss. 344, 355-56, 39 So. 489, 491
(1905)); Hicks v. Herring, 246 S.C. 429, 436, 144 S.E.2d 151, 154 (1965).
1985] 1391
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
assessed. °
C. The Problem of Mass Liability
Some courts and commentators fear that the litigating of thousands of
suits across the country and the attendant multiple punitive damage
awards may lead to the bankruptcy of corporations. The leading case
supporting this viewpoint is Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 5
Plaintiff developed cataracts from taking MER/29, a drug developed to
reduce blood cholesterol, and sued the drug's manufacturer.52 The Sec-
ond Circuit suggested that punitive damages should not be awarded in
cases in which the danger of multiple liability exists, primarily because of
the danger of bankruptcy.53 This argument has spawned much disagree-
ment. A number of courts have asserted that the fear of bankruptcy is
50. Owen II, supra note 37, at 19-20.
51. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
52. Id. at 834.
53. See id. at 839-41 (dictum). Judge Friendly also argued that punitive damages
were unnecessary, as pharmaceutical companies have other forces operating to deter
them from wrongful conduct, such as regulatory agencies, see Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 840,
the possibility of criminal fines, see id. at 841, and the possibility of significant compensa-
tory damages, see id. at 841.
Many other industries are also regulated. Brokerage firms, for example, are regulated
by the Securities Exchange Commission, see Globus v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 418 F.2d
1276, 1285 (2d Cir. 1969) (1933 Securities Act has punitive sections), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 913 (1970), chemical companies by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
see N.Y. Times, March 2, 1985, at A9, col. 5 (EPA fined Union Carbide Company $3.9
million for delay in reporting testing of harmful chemical), commodities firms by the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission, see Nash, Large Fine Levied on Donaldson,
N.Y. Times, March 12, 1985, at D1, col. 6 (firm fined for violating reporting require-
ments), and product manufacturers by the Consumer Products Safety Commission, see
15 U.S.C. §§ 2051, 2070 (1982) (provides for civil and criminal penalties for violation of
the Consumer Products Safety Act). But see deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d
1223, 1230 (10th Cir. 1970) (resources of Securities Exchange Commission are limited;
private action is necessary); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 287, 294
N.W.2d 437, 451-52 (1980) (no evidence that administrative sanctions are being pur-
sued).
It is thought that regulatory agencies exert a considerable influence on corporate deci-
sionmaking. Marsh, If it Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It, in Commentaries on Corporate Struc-
ture and Governance 295 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Commentaries].
Regulation is resented and resisted by corporate management. Braithewaite, The Limits
of Economism in Controlling Harmful Corporate Conduct, 16 L. & Soc'y Rev. 481, 483
(1981-82); Stevenson, The Corporation As Political Institution, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 39, 50-51
(1979). Thus, fear of incurring regulation may curtail abuses by management.
In addition, criminal fines are being imposed against corporations and corporate of-
ficers with increasing frequency. Lewin, Criminal Onus on Executives, N.Y. Times,
March 5, 1985, at D2, col. 1; cf United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 660, 668 (1975)
(affirming conviction of president of market chain); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, 251
Cal. App. 2d 689, 716 n.4, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 417 n.4 (1967) (corporation fined, officers
placed on probation). The possibility of criminal liability is likely to have a deterrent
effect on corporate managers. Crane, supra note 1, at 44. But see Abramson, punitive
damages in aircraft accident cases--a debate, 11 Forum 50, 52 (1975) (corporate officers
seldom prosecuted).
(Vol. 531392
INSURABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
overstated.54 Some of them cite David Owen's influential article Punitive
Damages in Products Liability Litigation55 for this proposition. 6 Even
Owen, however, has reassessed his argument. Although he suggested in
1976 that the fear of bankruptcy seemed mistaken, 7 he wrote in 1982
that "the increasing number and size of such awards may fairly raise
concern for the future stability of American industry.""8
A corporation might either choose or be forced to file for reorganiza-
tion59 rather than negotiate individually with a large number of plaintiffs
54. See, e.g., Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 838 n.15 (3d Cir. 1983);
Unified School Dist. No. 490 v. Celotex Corp., 6 Kan. App. 2d 346, 355, 629 P.2d 196,
206 (1981); Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 193 NJ. Super. 113, 128, 472 A.2d 577, 586
(1984); State ex reL Young v. Crooklam, 290 Or. 61, 66-67, 618 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1980);
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294, 294 N.W.2d 437, 455 (1980).
Friendly's position has received some support. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 525 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (punitive damages inappropriate in
asbestos litigation under Mississippi law because they are "incompatible with the objec-
tives of and would disrupt the viability of the strict liability cause of action"); In re Paris
Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir.) (prohibiting recovery of punitive damages in
wrongful death suit to avoid "excessive liability"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980);
Globus v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285-86 (2d Cir. 1969) (punitive
damages not recoverable under § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 913 (1970); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 1970)
(punitive damages not recoverable in private action under Rule l0b-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934); Sanford v. Celotex Corp., 598 F. Supp. 529, 531 (M.D. Tenn.
1984) (punitive damages inappropriate in strict liability litigation under Tennessee law).
Courts allowing punitive damages frequently express concern about the possible conse-
quences of mass awards. See In re Related Asbestos Cases, 566 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D.
Cal. 1983); Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d 1102, 1111, 427 N.E.2d 608,
616-17 (1981); Brandwen, supra note 29, at 478. One result of corporations being
bankrupted might be that some plaintiffs will remain uncompensated. See Jackson v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1330 (5th Cir. 1985) (Clark, J., dissenting);
Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 45 (E.D. Ky. 1977); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36
Bankr. 743, 746 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), appeal denied, 39 Bankr. 234 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1984).
55. See Owen I, supra note 1.
56. See, e.g., Unified School Dist. No. 490 v. Celotex Corp., 6 Kan. App. 2d 346, 355,
629 P.2d 196, 206 (1981); Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corps., 193 NJ. Super. 113, 121,
472 A.2d 577, 582 (1984); State ex reL Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61, 67, 618 P.2d
1268, 1271 (1980); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 289-90, 294 N.W.2d 437,
453 (1980).
57. See Owen I, supra note 1, at 1324-25. Owen did not dismiss the possible dangers
inherent in awarding punitive damages in mass liability situations. See id. at 1314. He
argued that current case law did not support the concern that awards could lead to bank-
ruptcy. See id., at 1324-25.
58. Owen II, supra note 37, at 6; see also Seltzer, supra note 2, at 54 (recent rise in
awards gives Roginsky renewed credibility).
59. The reorganizations chapter [11 U.S.C. 38 1101-1174 (1982)] is a way to
help a financially distressed business return to a viable state. The goal is 'to
restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its
employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockhold-
ers.' The rationale for providing an alternative to liquidation is that reorganiza-
tion 'is more economically efficient. . . because it preserves jobs and assets.'
Note, Relief From Tort Liability Through Reorganization, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1227, 1232
(1983) (footnotes omitted) (ellipsis in original) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5963, 6179) [hereinafter
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who have won awards which, if paid, might bankrupt the company. 60 It
is also possible that a corporation might prefer to file for reorganization
61
rather than negotiate with present claimants without knowing how many
other plaintiffs might later file suit.62 Bankruptcy proceedings allow the
corporation to consolidate the claims against it.63 It is also possible that
an award, even if paid over time, could be so large that although it was
not necessary for the company to declare bankruptcy, the owners would
have no beneficial return from their investment and so might choose re-
organization or even liquidation.6'
Some courts argue that the judicial system offers safeguards against the
danger of bankruptcy. First, the jury can be instructed about the com-
pany's possible future liability and about those awards already assessed
against the corporation.65 It is impossible, however, for the jury to pre-
dict the extent of the company's future liability. 66 In addition, the jury,
cited as Relief From Tort Liability]; see In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 743, 746-
47 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), appeal denied, 39 Bankr. 234 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). Even suc-
cessful reorganization has serious consequences, particularly for management, which is
likely to lose control of the company's operation. Relief From Tort Liability, supra, at
1241. Fear of reorganization should therefore deter management from committing acts
that it has reason to believe may lead to a punitive damages award.
60. See In re UNR Indus., 29 Bankr. 741, 743 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983) (asbestos man-
ufacturer filed for reorganization to avoid overwhelming future litigation), appeal dis-
missed, 725 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 743, 745
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (same), appeal denied, 39 Bankr. 234 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re
Amatex Corp., 37 Bankr. 613, 613 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (same), rev'd, 755 F.2d 1034
(3d Cir. 1985).
61. The issue of discharge of tort liability in bankruptcy has not yet been resolved. It
is possible that courts will not permit a corporate defendant to discharge liability as to
future claimants through reorganization. See In re UNR Indus., 29 Bankr. 741, 745
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983). In In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 743 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y.), appeal denied, 39 Bankr. 234 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984), the court recognized
that "resolution of the interests of future claimants is a central focus of these reorganiza-
tion proceedings." Id. at 746. The court did not, however, decide the issue of dis-
chargeability. See id. at 754-55; see also In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1041 (3d Cir.
1985) (future claimants should be represented in reorganization whether or not their
claims can be affected by reorganization plan).
62. See Kreindler, Punitive Damages in Aviation Litigation-An Essay, 8 Cum. L.
Rev. 607, 615 (1978).
63. Relief From Tort Liability, supra note 59, at 1240; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1471, 1478
(1982).
64. Cf Comment, Will Financially Sound Corporate Debtors Succeed in Using Chap-
ter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act as a Shield Against Massive Tort Liability?, 56 Temp. L.Q.
539, 541 (1983) (Unarco Industries filed for reorganization "primarily to prevent the
diminution of its assets.").
65. Unified School Dist. No. 490 v. Celotex Corp., 6 Kan. App. 2d 346, 355, 629 P.2d
196, 206 (1981); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 304, 294 N.W.2d 437, 459-
60 (1980). Courts have exhibited a reluctance to issue such instructions. In Neal v. Ca-
rey Can. Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982), the court refused to allow an
asbestos manufacturer to introduce evidence of pending lawsuits, see id. at 387-88, deem-
ing the evidence "too speculative and vague," id. at 388. The court did allow the com-
pany to introduce an accountant's report discussing the possible impact of the litigation.
See id. at 388.
66. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967); Schul-
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influenced by the revelation that another jury has already found the cor-
poration's conduct worthy of punitive damages, might award them even
though the jury might otherwise have awarded only compensatory dam-
ages or no damages at all." The danger also exists that the jury may
punish the company not only for the injury to the plaintiff presently
before it, but on behalf of all the other people that the jurors think the
company may have injured. 8 The judge's power of review is of only
limited use in this situation, because he knows nothing more about possi-
ble future awards than does the jury and so cannot determine whether
the jury is abusing its discretion. 9
It is also argued that a company deserves to be bankrupted if it has
behaved so egregiously that punitive damage awards sufficient to bank-
rupt the company are assessed.70 However, the jury should not be the
one to say not only that the company's behavior was culpable, but also
that it was egregious enough to justify bankruptcy.7
Whether punitive damages are desirable or not, they are awarded.
Permitting corporations to insure against punitive damages will not pre-
vent the danger that they will be abused, but it at least allows a corpora-
tion to protect against that possibility.
II. THE VALIDITY OF THE POLICIES AGAINST INSURANCE IN THE
CORPORATE SETTING
As has been discussed in the previous section, the availability of puni-
tive damages against a corporation poses particular problems. Most
courts addressing the insurability of punitive damages, however, have
kin, Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill, 30 Hastings LJ. 1797, 1806 (1979);
see Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1319 app. (5th Cir. 1985).
67. See Schulkin, supra note 66, at 1806-07.
68. See Morris, supra note 26, at 1194-95; Wheeler, supra note 2, at 287-88. Judges
are equally likely to be influenced by evidence that the corporation's conduct has affected
more than the plaintiff at bar and to punish the defendant for acts not at issue in the case.
See Wills v. Trans World Airlines, 200 F. Supp. 360, 367-68 (S.D. Cal. 1961) (considering
prior violations in determining equity of punitive damage award); Unified School Dist.
No. 490 v. Celotex Corp., 6 Kan. App. 2d 346, 356, 629 P.2d 196, 207 (1981) (consider-
ing "nationwide course of conduct" in determining whether punitive damage award is
excessive). To avoid prejudice, a corporation might choose not to present evidence of its
possible liability in other jurisdictions. See Unified School Dist No. 490 v. Celotex Corp.,
6 Kan. App. 2d 346, 355, 629 P.2d 196, 206 (1981).
69. See Globus v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285 (2d. Cir. 1969) (no
way for courts to fairly restrict punitive damage awards), cerL denied, 397 U.S. 913
(1970); Hanlon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 599 F. Supp. 376, 381 (N.D. Iowa 1984)
(The court refused to limit punitive damage awards because of insufficient proof that
defendants "have actually been subjected to judgments for punitive damages that in fact
threaten their corporate existence." The judge apparently did not choose to consider pos-
sible future awards.); Wheeler, supra note 2, at 288 Oudicial review "does little to mini-
mize the risk of erroneous results").
70. See Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 838 n.15 (3d Cir. 1983); Martin v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 322 Pa. Super. 348, 368, 469 A.2d 655, 665 (1983).
71. According to Coffee, even a judge should not have the power to bankrupt a com-
pany. Coffee, supra note 30, at 9.
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chosen to ignore the differences between corporations and individuals,
presumably clinging to the notion that because a corporation is a person
in the eyes of the law there should be no distinction in the legal treatment
of the two.7" Because insurability is determined by the judicial interpre-
tation of state policy,7 3 however, corporations and individuals should be
treated identically in this area only if the policies behind the rule apply to
corporations as they do to individuals. In reality, many of the arguments
against insuring punitive damages do not hold true for corporations. 7
4
A. The Effect of Insurance on Deterrence of Misconduct
The argument that insuring against punitive damages will eliminate
their deterrence value75 is unpersuasive in the corporate setting. The de-
terrence value of punitive damages is uncertain, and what value there is
will not be eliminated by the availability of insurance.
1. Predictability of Punitive Damage Liability
It is difficult for the corporate defendant to know what behavior might
72. See Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 466, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416,
427 (1974). The principle that a corporation is a person in the eyes of the law was formu-
lated by the Supreme Court in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394,
396 (1886). The general acceptance of this concept, see First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 780 n.15 (1978) (citing Santa Clara County, 118 U.S. at 396); Power Mfg. Co.
v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490, 493 (1927) (same); EEOC v. Corry Jamestown Corp., 719
F.2d 1219, 1222 (3d Cir. 1983) (same); Hudson Valley Freedom Theater, Inc. v. Heim-
bach, 671 F.2d 702, 706 n.4 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982), may
account for the absence of judicial discussion of whether prohibiting corporate insurance
of punitive damages, will better effectuate the goals of punitive damages, see Moran v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 816 (6th Cir. 1982) (corporation is liable just
as a natural person would be); Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 108 (6th Cir.
1975) (same), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Mercury Motors Express Inc. v. Smith,
393 So. 2d 545, 547 (Fla. 1981) (same); Memphis & Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Nagel, 97
Ky. 9, 14, 29 S.W. 743, 744 (1895) (same). But see First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit
Co., 283 Md. 228, 241, 389 A.2d 359, 366 (1978) (discussing possible impact of punitive
damage award on small businessmen, and allowing insurance); Harrell v. Travelers In-
dem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 210-11, 567 P.2d 1013, 1020 (1977) (en banc) (same). It has been
suggested that calling a corporation a legal person creates the danger that a corporation
will be thought of as a person, without regard to the factors that distinguish corporations
and individuals. See Crane, supra note 1, at 39; Machen, Corporate Personality, 24 Harv.
L. Rev. 253, 265 (1911); Stone, supra note 31, at 3-4; Note, The Endless Problem of
Corporate Personality, 32 Colum. L. Rev. 643, 652-53 (1932).
73. See Nicholson v. American Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52, 54 (Dist. Ct.
App. Fla. 1965); Variety Farms, Inc. v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 172 N.J. Super. 10, 24-25,
410 A.2d 696, 703 (1980); Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227, 233 (W. Va. 1981).
74. Many courts do not believe that these arguments apply to individuals. Many
jurisdictions that have decided that public policy does not prohibit insurance have done
so in the context of the individual. See, e.g., Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972) (en banc); Continental Ins. Cos. v. Hancock, 507
S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1973); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Kambly, 114 Mich. App. 683, 319 N.W.2d
382 (1982); Anthony v. Frith, 394 So.2d 867 (Miss. 1981); Lazenby v. Universal Under-
writers Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964). Whether these policies apply to
individuals, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
75. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
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warrant a punitive damage award and so should be avoided. Each juris-
diction,76 and sometimes it seems each judge," determines the type of
behavior warranting an award. Moreover, the standards under which
courts award punitive damages-for example "wanton," ".gross, .... out-
rageous," "reckless disregard"s--are imprecise.79 As one commentator
has noted, "there is always room for difference of opinion in the applica-
tion of such abstract standards as 'recklessness' or 'malice'."o
In the business area it is particularly difficult to predict what actions
might lead to punitive damage awards. Business decisions often allow
for differing interpretations,"' and judges sitting on the same case can
76. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1967); Vol-
lert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348, 1350 (D. Hawaii 1975).
77. See infra notes 82-89.
78. K-g., Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 420 F. Supp.
92, 95 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (" '[w]henever the elements of fraud, malice, gross negligence or
oppression mingle in the controversy' ") (quoting Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322, 325
(1854)); Louisiana Oil Refining Corp. v. Yelton, 188 Ark. 280, 285, 65 S.W.2d 537, 539
(1933) (willful, wanton, and malicious conduct); Temmen v. Kent-Brown Chevrolet Co.,
227 Kan. 45, 51, 605 P.2d 95, 100 (1980) ("fraud, malice, gross negligence, oppression or
wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights are needed in order to recover punitive damages");
Pettengill v. Turo, 159 Me. 350, 362, 193 A.2d 367, 374 (1963) ("punitive damages are
recoverable in all actions upon tortious acts that involve ingredients of malice, fraud or
insult, or wanton and reckless disregard of plaintiff's rights"); Veselenak v. Smith, 414
Mich. 567, 574-75, 327 N.W.2d 261, 264 (1982) ("conduct. ..[so] malicious or so will-
ful and wanton as to demonstrate a reckless disregard of plaintiffs' rights"); Leichtamer v.
American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 471, 424 N.E.2d 568, 579 (1981) ("punitive
damages may be awarded in tort cases involving fraud, malice or insult"); Samuels v.
Richmond & D.R. Co., 35 S.C. 493, 505-06, 14 S.E. 943, 946 (1892) (If an injury has been
"wantonly and wilflly infficted, or with such a gross want of care and regard for the
rights of others as to justify the presumption of wilfulness or wantonness, the court will
instruct the jury that they are at liberty to find for the plaintiff.") (quoting II S. Thomp-
son, The Law of Negligence 1264 (1880).
79. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 79, 79 (1982);
Ellis, supra note 8, at 36-37. It is difficult to determine what type of action will merit a
punitive damage award. Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Ky.
1974); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 682 P.2d 975, 980 (Wyo. 1984);
Lentz, supra note 17, at 317; Oshins, supra note 7, at 81; Rabin, Dealing With Disasters:
Some Thoughts on the Adequacy of the Legal System, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 281, 297 (1978);
Comment, Factors Affecting Punitive Damages, 7 Miami L.Q. 517, 519 (1953).
80. D. Dobbs, supra note 1, § 3.9, at 206.
81. A business decision is inevitably judged at trial through hindsight. A decision
that seemed correct at the time it was made can be proved drastically wrong; making the
wrong choice should not necessarily be grounds for a punitive damage award. Roginsky
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 843 (2d Cir. 1967); see Joy v. North, 692 F.2d
880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); Johnston, Corporate Indemni-
fication and Liability Insurance for Directors and Officers, 33 Bus. Law 1993, 2035 (1978);
Owen II, supra note 37, at 13-14; Slain, Risk Distribution and Treble Damages: Insurance
and Contribution, 45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 263, 269 (1970). Additionally, because juries are
often hostile to the corporate defendant, see supra notes 30, 37-40 and accompanying
text, particularly if the plaintiff has been physically injured, the jury may be unfairly
influenced in its interpretation of the business decision. Owen II, supra note 37, at 12 &
n.61; see In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976
(1980). In Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1978), the plaintiff wore a
colostomy bag in defendant's department store. See id. at 431. Upon leaving, he was
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analyze the same behavior differently. In Brookridge Party Center, Inc. v.
Fisher Foods, Inc.,2 for example, the majority found the water damage
caused by a second-story grocery store to the shop below it merited the
imposition of $215,500 in punitive damages:83 The concurring judge
thought that on the whole the grocery was merely following necessary
business practices,84 and that punitive damages of more than $25,000
would be "motivated by the popular view of socking the big corpora-
tions."85 Judges in different jurisdictions can also come to opposite con-
clusions. This is evidenced by the outcome of litigation arising out of
MER/29. For example, in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,86 the
court denied a request for punitive damages, finding that the defendant's
conduct did not support a finding that the directors exhibited "deliberate
disregard for human welfare."8" On the same facts, the court in Toole v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc.88 found evidence that the board was aware of
wrongdoing and upheld a jury award of $250,000 in punitive damages.89
Multiple damages imposed by statute are often considered to be puni-
tive.90 The damages follow automatically from the violation, and in or-
der to be subject to multiple damages, it is not even necessary for the
corporation to have intended the violation.91 Because the corporation
stopped by a security guard who suspected him of shoplifting. See id. The guard, who
understood English poorly, did not understand plaintiff's explanation for the bulge in his
shirt. Id. at 431-32. He pulled the bag, and the resulting injury to the plaintiff required
surgery. Id. at 432. The plaintiff was awarded $180,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 432.
Had the plaintiff not been injured in the exchange, it seems questionable whether a jury
would have found that the store's negligence in hiring the guard merited a punitive dam-
age award.
82. 12 Ohio App. 3d 130, 468 N.E.2d 63 (1983).
83. See id. at 131, 468 N.E.2d at 66.
84. See id. at 138, 468 N.E.2d at 72 (Dahling, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 138, 468 N.E.2d at 73 (Dahling, J., concurring); see also Martin v. Johns-
Manville Co., 322 Pa. Super. 348, 380, 469 A.2d 655, 671 (1983) (Wieand, J., dissenting
in part) (objecting to punitive damage award; company's conduct not clearly outrageous);
American Motors Corp. v. Ellis, 403 So. 2d 459, 469 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (Cowart,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disputing majority's judgment that the
evidence supported a punitive damage award; company's actions were the result of "prac-
tical economic considerations"); Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d
456, 482, 424 N.E.2d 568, 585 (1981) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that the jury's
punitive damage award was unsupported by the evidence).
86. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
87. Id. at 850.
88. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
89. See id. at 712, 717, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 414-15, 418.
90. See Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91,
99, 267 N.W.2d 595, 599 (1978). See supra note 1.
91. Note, Insurance Coverage of Punitive Damages, 84 Dick. L. Rev. 221, 237 (1979);
see United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1972) (intentional
wrongdoing is not an element of Sherman Act violation), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125
(1973); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (com-
pany found to have monopolized the market although its conduct was not intentional);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 297 (D. Mass. 1953)
(same), af'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); cf Slain, supra note 81, at 269 (antitrust violations do
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cannot know what behavior may give rise to a punitive damage award,
the prospect of statutory multiple damages will have little or no deterrent
effect.
2. Corporate Safeguards and Employee Deterrence
One of the rationales for allowing the award of punitive damages
against corporations is that the possibility of a punitive damages award
may influence a company to try to establish safeguards or improve ex-
isting ones." It is both practically and economically impossible, how-
ever, for a corporation to institute administrative procedures that will
totally eliminate the type of behavior that may leave a corporation vul-
nerable to punitive damages.9 3 The difficulties of a corporation in insti-
tuting effective safeguards against employee misdoing are complicated by
the fact that corporate employees have little or nothing to lose if the
company is fined.94 Although corporations are persons in the eyes of the
law, they still act through individuals whose goals may differ from those
of the corporation." As one commentator has noted, albeit in the context
of corporate crime:
Where is an incongruence between the aims and interests of the indi-
vidual and those of the organization which employs him. Even if a
penalty structure is adequate to deter the corporation as an entity, indi-
viduals within the firm would, often, still have an incentive to engage in
the criminal behavior in question.96
Insurance should be available to shield the company from liability that
it may not be able to prevent. The availability of insurance does not
discourage a corporation from exercising care in the hiring and supervi-
sion of its employees,97 as this is one of the factors an insurance company
not involve "conduct clearly ascertainable as illegal at the time the conduct [is]
undertaken").
92. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858, 865 (Iowa 1983); Kline
v. Multi-Media Cablevision, Inc., 233 Kan. 988, 992, 666 P.2d 711, 715 (1983); 2 G.
Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice § 564, at 36-37 (1959); Ellis, supra note 8, at
69; Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and
Sanctions, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1141, 1162 (1983).
93. See Tolle v. Interstate Sys. Truck Lines, 42 Ill. App. 3d 771, 773, 356 N.E.2d 625,
627 (1976) (increased supervision may not enable employer to prevent torts that may lead
to punitive damage liability); Slain, supra note 81, at 271-72 (instructions to employees
will not necessarily be followed). See infra notes 99-128 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 100-28 and accompanying text.
95. Coffee, supra note 30, at 10-11; Fisse, supra note 92, at 1216; see C. Stone, supra
note 33, at 43-44 (employee at automobile plant discovered a defect; correction was re-
sisted by "every hierarchy of the plant" although "it would have often been in the inter-
ests of 'the corporation"' to remedy); Slain, supra note 81, at 270 (employees focus
narrowly on profitability).
96. Coffee, supra note 30, at 9 (emphasis in original).
97. This is one of the primary goals of vicarious liability. Harrell v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 279 Or. 199, 214, 567 P.2d 1013, 1020 (1977) (en banc); Kline v. Multi-Media
1985] 1399
1400 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53
considers when determining premiums.98
3. Deterring Middle Level Managers
Most corporate misbehavior occurs at the middle managerial level.9 9
Middle level managers are under considerable pressure. If they do not
achieve the goals set by the board, they risk losing their jobs or damaging
their promotion prospects.2° Their thinking tends to focus on short-
term goals. 10' One of the arguments for the insurance of punitive dam-
ages is that there is no reason to believe that tortfeasors weigh the bene-
fits against the risks before they act.102 This may be less true of a
corporation, in which cost/benefit analyses are commonplace, but where
the misconduct occurs at the middle managerial level, if any analysis is
made it is likely to be whether the risk outweighs the benefit not for the
company, but only for the individual manager.' If forped to balance
the possibility of being fired or demoted for not meeting this year's goals
against the possibility of punitive damages being assessed against the cor-
poration in the future, the manager may choose the latter.
The middle level manager has good reason to believe that he will be
unaffected even if punitive damages are assessed against the corporation.
Although the corporate employee is liable for his torts, 0" the plaintiff is
unlikely to sue him, because he probably cannot pay the award if sued
personally. 105 Thus, intra-corporate discipline is all that the employee
Cablevision, Inc., 233 Kan. 988, 990, 666 P.2d 711, 713 (1983); Prosser and Keeton,
supra note I, § 1, at 13.
98. Oesterle, Limits on a Corporation's Protection of its Directors and Officers from
Personal Liability, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 513, 526.
99. Coffee, supra note 30, at 10; Owen I, supra note 1, at 1306; Slain, supra note 81, at
269.
100. Coffee, supra note 30, at 11; Schwartz, The Paradigm of Federal Chartering, in
Commentaries, supra note 53, at 330.
101. C. Stone, supra note 33, at 44; Schwartz, The Paradigm of Federal Chartering, in
Commentaries, supra note 53, at 330; Slain, supra note 81, at 270.
102. Skyline Harvestore Sys. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 331 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Iowa 1983);
see Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Kambly, 114 Mich. App. 683, 687, 319 N.W.2d 382, 385 (1982)
(insurance does not influence defendant to commit torts); Mazza v. Medical Mut. Ins.
Co., 311 N.C. 621, -, 319 S.E.2d 217, 221 (1984) (same).
103. Coffee, supra note 30, at 10-11; see C. Stone, supra note 33, at 46 (employees are
undeterred by prospect of corporation being fined).
104. Tedrow v. Deskins, 265 Md. 546, 550, 290 A.2d 799, 802 (1972); W. Fletcher,
Cyclopedia of Corporations § 1135, at 500 (perm. ed. 1978); H. Henn & J. Alexander,
Law of Corporations § 218, at 583 (3d ed. 1983). The corporation can also interplead the
employee. Restatement of Agency § 399 comment h (1958).
105. 2 G. Hornstein, supra note 92, § 565, at 39. Directors and officers usually have
liability insurance. H. Henn & J. Alexander, supra note 104, § 380, at 1145. In jurisdic-
tions in which insuring punitive damages is against public policy, however, that insurance
will not protect them. See Oesterle, supra note 98, at 550. Even if punitive damages are
insurable, however, the language of most Director and Officer policies prohibits indemni-
fication against fines or penalties. Johnston, supra note 81, at 2016; Oesterle, supra note
98, at 563. Assuming that "penalties" is interpreted to include civil as well as criminal
penalties, Director and Officer insurance policies will be held to exclude coverage for
punitive damages. Johnston, supra note 81, at 2026, 2027.
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has to fear.106 In addition, the prospect that an employee will suffer
either legal or intra-corporate sanctions as a result of his wrongdoing is
made less likely by the nature of corporate decisionmaking itself. It is
frequently impossible or extremely difficult to isolate one person who is
responsible for the misdeed."0 7 In fact, it is likely that there is no one
person responsible, but rather that the decision was the result of a series
of actions taken by a chain of people, each with different information
available to them and each with different priorities. 08 Even if one em-
ployee is responsible and the corporation is able to isolate him, it is possi-
ble that he will no longer be working for the company when the damages
are assessed.
4. Deterring Senior Managers and the Board
Insured punitive damages will probably deter misconduct by senior
managers and the board of directors as well as do uninsured punitive
damages. Because the professional reputations-and the professional
ego-of corporate officers are tied to the performance of their compa-
nies," °9 they will probably attempt to avoid any action that would ad-
versely affect their respective companies.
Although it is argued that the deterrent value of punitive damages will
not be realized if the tortfeasor is allowed to shift his liability, because he
will escape responsibility for his actions, insurance is not a panacea for
all the dangers posed by the possibility of punitive damages. The award
of punitive damages will probably cause a company's insurance premi-
ums to be raised.110 Liability insurance is a substantial expense,III and
the possibility of liability leading to a rate increase is one that the corpo-
ration is likely to consider in planning corporate activities." 2 There are
indications that insurance rates can be sufficiently onerous to affect a cor-
106. Discipline "may range from ostracism and 'passing over' in the matter of promo-
tions and raises, to dismissal, or even the institution of an employer's indemnity action."
Stone, supra note 31, at 29.
107. G. Hornstein, supra note 92, § 564, at 36; Coffee, supra note 30, at 13; Stone,
supra note 31, at 31; see United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th
Cir. 1972), cerL denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
108. Owen II, supra note 37, at 15.
109. See Stevenson, supra note 53, at 45.
110. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
111. See Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 487, 502 P.2d 522,
524 (1972) (en banc); State v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 137 VL 313, 319, 404 A.2d 101, 105
(1979); Abramson, punitive damages in aircraft accident cases--a debate, 11 Forum 50,
54 (1975); Oshins, supra note 7, at 79.
112. See Owen I, supra note 1, at 1309 & n.247 (expense and increasing difficulty of
getting insurance); Diamond, Insurance Against Pollution is Cut, N.Y. Times, March 11,
1985, at Al, col. 6, D12, col. 5 ("According to chemical executives, [a] company that
paid $700,000 last year for $200 million in insurance will pay perhaps $2 million this year
for a quarter the amount of coverage-if coverage can be obtained at all.") [hereinafter
cited as Insurance]; Product Liability, supra note 3, at A6, col. 2 (discussing rising insur-
ance costs and the difficulty of obtaining insurance).
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poration's way of doing business.113 In fact, at least one company has
gone out of business as a result of soaring product liability insurance
costs." 4 Another company, one of the two American manufacturers of
the vaccine against whooping cough, a potentially fatal disease, quit the
market because its premiums were drastically increased; the move was
expected to worsen existing shortages. 115 Moreover, frequently a com-
pany may not carry insurance sufficient to withstand the damages that
may result from a mass liability situation. 1 6 Fear of exceeding cover-
age" 7 or of being unable to obtain coverage"' should have a deterrent
effect, particularly given the unpredictability of punitive damage awards.
Furthermore, compensatory liability alone, as well as the cost of defend-
ing lawsuits, can be onerous and sufficient to deter misdeeds." 19
Moreover, other economic consequences may attend the award of pu-
nitive damages against a corporation. Stock prices, one indicator of cor-
porate success, may fall if punitive damages are awarded against a
corporation. 20 A substantial part of the salary of the highest officers of a
corporation is likely to be in stock options,' 2 1 and any drop in stock
113. See Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 838 (3d Cir. 1983); G. Sullivan,
supra note 35, at 17; Owen I, supra note 1, at 1309-10; Insurance, supra note 112, at D12,
col. 6; Lewin, Pharmaceutical Companies Are the Hardest Hit, N.Y. Times, March 10,
1985, § 3, at 1, col. 3.
114. G. Sullivan, supra note 35, at 3 (Havir Manufacturing Company was dissolved in
1975 "because its product liability insurance quotes for 1976 were 50 times what it had
been paying in 1975.").
115. N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1984, at A21, col. 1.
116. Cf In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 419 (W.D. Mo.) (defendants had
$333 million in insurance; lawsuits sought over $1 billion), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); Union Carbide Fights For Its Life, Bus. Wk., Dec.
24, 1984, at 52, 55 (company's insurance coverage estimated at $200 million; lawsuits had
been filed asking $20 billion).
117. See Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 487, 502 P.2d 522,
524 (1972) (en banc); Skyline Harvestore Sys. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 331 N.W.2d 106,
109 (Iowa 1983); Oshins, supra note 7, at 79.
118. See Skyline Harvestore Sys. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 331 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Iowa
1983); First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 242, 389 A.2d 359, 366
(1978); Oshins, supra note 7, at 79; Owen I, supra note 1, at 1309-10; Insurance, supra
note 112, at Al, col. 6.
119. A Business Week survey estimated that A.H. Robins had spent $259 million to
resolve suits arising from injuries allegedly caused by the Dalkon Shield, that the MGM
Grand Hotel fire cost the company $100 million, and that the Stouffer hotel fire had cost
$50 million. See Union Carbide Fights For Its Life, Bus. Wk., Dec. 24, 1984, at 52, 56; see
also Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1336 app. (5th Cir. 1985)
(asbestos companies spent over $1 billion between the early 1970's and 1982 in connec-
tion with asbestos litigation). Mass tort litigation also consumes an enormous amount of
a corporation's time and manpower. See In re Johns Manville Corp., 26 Bankr. 420, 429-
30 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
120. It is thought that a negative corporate image engendered by a punitive damage
award can reduce earnings, which will reflect on stock prices. See Reich, Corporate Ac-
countability and Regulatory Reform, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 5, 18 (1979); Stevenson, supra
note 53, at 50. Drastically raised insurance rates, see supra notes 111-19 and accompany-
ing text, may also have an effect on corporate earnings by reducing the profit margin.
121. See Cuff, Those Well-Paid Executives, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1984, at DI, col. 3
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value will hurt their portfolios. Furthermore, a fall in stock prices may,
in an extreme case, lead to a takeover bid, and result in management's
loss of control over the corporation.
Finally, corporate management's sensitivity to negative publicity"z
provides a deterrent to corporate misconduct. One consideration of cor-
porate managers contemplating a wrongful act will be the likelihood of
its being exposed. Allowing punitive damages may encourage suits,1
24
thus increasing the likelihood that wrongful corporate behavior will be
brought to light. This will also enhance the chance that the suit will
receive publicity, because large awards attract the attention of journal-
ists.'2 ' The identification of upper level managers and the board with the
corporation they serve will probably deter them from committing acts
that they have reason to believe will impact negatively on the company.
Because insurance premiums are a burden on the corporation, a burden
that will in all likelihood be increased if punitive damages are assessed
against the company, the prospect of even an insured punitive damage
award should deter these employees from committing wrongful acts.
B. The Effect of Insurance on Punishment of the Wrongdoer
One rationale behind prohibiting the insurance of punitive damages is
to ensure that the culpable party is adequately punished and is unable to
pass on his liability.' 26 If the party who bears the burden of punitive
damages is not the one who is actually responsible for the wrongdoing,
however, there is no reason to forbid insurance. Courts recognizing this
principle created the vicarious liability exception. In jurisdictions in
(NCR Inc. chairman accumulated "S12,154,000 in gains from exercising stock options
accumulated over 10 years.")
122. Reich, supra note 120, at 19; see Werner, supra note 37, at 403-04. Stock values
are taken into consideration in corporate management decisions. Marsh, in Commenta-
ries, supra note 53, at 297; Werner, supra note 37, at 402-04. One undesirable result of
lowered stock prices would be having to face dissatisfied shareholders at the annual meet-
ing, which is psychologically stressful for management. See Stevenson, supra note 53, at
46. A corporate loss could also lead to a shareholder derivative suit. Slain, supra note 81,
at 274. Finally, lowered share values may make it more difficult for a corporation to
borrow money. DuBois, supra note 2, at 350; Werner, supra note 37, at 403.
123. Fisse, supra note 92, at 1153; see Marsh, in Commentaries, supra note 53, at 296;
Note, Punitive Damages, The Common Question Class Action, and the Concept of
Overkill, 13 Pac. L.J. 1273, 1295 (1982); see also Its Best Face, N.Y. Daily News, Dec. 21,
1984, at 40, col. 3 (Union Carbide hired public relations firm after Bhopal disaster, firm
had been used by Johnson & Johnson after the Tylenol tamperings); Burnham, G.M.
Faces Tough Challenge Over X-Car Safety, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1984, at A19, col. 1
(G.M. began publicity campaign, partly in response to a negative image engendered by
flawed cars).
124. See supra note 1.
125. See, eg., $125 Million Award Suggested: Computerland Jury Decides, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 14, 1985, at D4, col. 6; Cessna Told to Pay $30 Million in Suit, N.Y. Tunes,
June 9, 1984, § 1, at 26, col. 3; Jury Awards Surgeon's Kin Over S8 Million From Insurer,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1984, § 1, at 68, col. 1; $10 Million is Awarded Over a Polio Vaccine,
N.Y. Times, June 3, 1984, § 1, at 58, col. 1.
126. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
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which an employer can be held vicariously liable for the acts of his ser-
vants under the doctrine of respondeat superior, 127 the employer can
shift his liability to his insurance company. 128 However, the division be-
tween vicarious liability, which can be shifted, and direct liability, which
cannot, is artificial in a publicly held corporation. 29 Even if managerial
level employees were either responsible for or ratified the wrongful con-
duct, and the corporation's liability was therefore direct,130 the people
who would be hurt by the award would not only be those responsible for
the wrongdoing: they would also include the stockholders.
1. Injuries to the Shareholders
It is primarily the shareholders who are hurt by punitive damages
awards.13 ' Their dividends will be cut in an attempt to recoup the loss,
127. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior an employer is strictly liable for a tort
of his employee committed within the scope of employment. Sandifer Oil Co. v. Dew,
220 Miss. 609, 630, 71 So. 2d 752, 758 (1954); 2 G. Hornstein, supra note 92, § 565, at 38;
W. Sell, Agency § 95, at 84 (1975); see, e.g., Western Coach Corp. v. Vaughn, 9 Ariz.
App. 336, 338-39, 452 P.2d 117, 119-20 (1969); Louisiana Oil Ref. Corp. v. Yelton, 188
Ark. 280, 285, 65 S.W.2d 537, 539 (1933); U.S. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So. 2d
1061, 1063 (Fla. 1983); Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655, 669 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978); Rickman v. Safeway Stores, 124 Mont. 451, 457, 227 P.2d 607, 611 (1951); Stroud
v. Denny's Restaurant, Inc., 271 Or. 430, 435, 532 P.2d 790, 793 (1975) (en bane). A
minority of jurisdictions does not allow a corporation to be held liable for punitive dam-
ages unless its liability is direct. See, e.g., In re Related Asbestos Cases, 566 F. Supp. 818,
824-25 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Holland Furnace Co. v. Robson, 157 Colo. 347, 352-53, 402
P.2d 628, 631 (1965); Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So. 2d 545, 547 (Fla.
1981).
128. See, e.g., Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 420 F.
Supp. 92, 96 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Continental Ins. Cos. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146, 151
(Ky. 1973); Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155, 1160
(Okla. 1980); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 214, 224 A.2d 793, 800 (1966).
129. See Fisse, supra note 92, at 1187.
130. A company's liability may be direct when the agent is authorized to do the act,
e.g., Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 551 F. Supp. 110, 112 (D. Hawaii 1982); Spahn v. Guild
Indus. Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 143, 156, 156 Cal. Rptr. 375, 383 (1979); Holland Furnace
Co. v. Robson, 157 Colo. 347, 352, 402 P.2d 628, 631 (1965); C. McCormick, supra note
1, § 80, at 283, the act is one of company policy, In re Related Asbestos Cases, 566 F.
Supp. 818, 825 (N.D. Cal. 1983), the agent was employed in a managerial capacity, Ro-
ginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 842 (2d Cir. 1967); Spahn v. Guild
Indus., 94 Cal. App. 3d 143, 156, 156 Cal. Rptr. 375, 383 (1979); Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 909(c) (1977), or the action is subsequently ratified, Jenkins v. Whittaker
Corp., 551 F. Supp. 110, 112 (D. Hawaii 1982); Spahn v. Guild Indus. Corp., 94 Cal.
App. 3d 143, 156 Cal. Rptr. 375, 383 (1979); Holland Furnace Co. v. Robson, 157 Colo.
347, 352, 402 P.2d 628, 631 (1965); American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. First Wis.
Mortgage Trust, 577 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). Ratification has been found
when the employee was not fired subsequent to discovery of the act. Coats v. Constr. &
Gen. Laborers Local No. 185, 15 Cal. App. 3d 908, 914, 93 Cal. Rptr. 639, 642 (1971);
Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 227 (1869); C. McCormick, supra note 1, at
283-84. But see U.S. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Fla. 1983)
(retention of employee is insufficient to establish ratification). This presents a danger that
the employer may fire an employee whose behavior has created even the possibility of a
punitive damage award. Morris, supra note 26, at 1204.
131. C. McCormick, supra note 1, § 80, at 283; Owen I, supra note 1, at 1299-300;
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and the value of their investments will drop.132 Given the separation
between ownership and management in a public corporation,1 33 the
shareholders are not the people who actually make the decisions that
lead to liability, yet they will suffer for the employee's misdeeds. In effect,
the liability of the shareholders is always vicarious: they are owners re-
sponsible for the acts of their servants.
Some commentators and courts do not find the idea of shareholder
liability objectionable. 13  They argue that the shareholders are not "in-
nocent," because they had the opportunity to elect the board members or
disapprove the corporation's actions.1 35 Most shareholders, however, do
not take an active role in corporate governance or elections.1 36 Further-
more, shareholders' ability to participate is limited by current securities
regulations, 137 as well as by general corporate structure; they thus do not
have an effective opportunity to monitor the board.1 31
It is further argued that the shareholders have received the benefit of
the corporate wrongdoing and so should also accept the liability. 139 This
overlooks the fact that most shareholders do not hold their stocks indefi-
nitely, 1 and that the people who own a company's stock today may not
have received dividends reflecting the benefit of yesterday's wrongful cor-
Slain, supra note 81, at 273; Note, The Assessment of Punitive Damages Against An Entre-
preneur for the Malicious Torts of His Employees, 70 Yale L.J. 1296, 1306 (1961) [herein-
after cited as Assessment of Punitive Damages].
132. See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 288, 294 N.W.2d 437, 452 (1980)
(punitive damage award may result in a lower profit margin for the company) (quoting
Barager v. Ford Motor Co., No. 76 CV 215 (Sept. 15, 1977, Eau Claire County); Long I,
supra note 24, at 872. See supra note 120.
133. See Hetherington, When the Sleeper Wakes Reflections on Corporate Governance
and Shareholder Rights, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 183, 184 (1979); Marsh, in Commentaries,
supra note 53, at 294; Owen I, supra note 1, at 1299-300. But see Conard, Business Corpo-
rations in American Society, in Commentaries, supra note 53, at 45 (public corporations
are usually controlled by small blocks of shareholders).
134. See, eg., Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 322 Pa. Super. 348, 366-68, 469 A.2d
655, 664-65 (1983); Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 466, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 416, 427 (1974). See infra notes 135, 139 and 142.
135. See Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 322 Pa. Super. 348, 366, 469 A.2d 655, 664
(1983).
136. See Garrett, The Limited Role of Corporation Statutes, in Commentaries, supra
note 53, at 98; Hetherington, supra note 133, at 213.
137. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13482 [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) t 81,130, at 87,891 (Apr. 28, 1977). Management can prevent share-
holders from presenting proposals for corporate action at the annual meeting if the pro-
posal "deals with a matter relating to the conduct of... ordinary business operations."
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1984). This is likely to include conduct that may lead to a puni-
tive damage award.
138. H. Henn & J. Alexander, supra note 104, § 188, at 491, n.8; Assessment of Puni-
tive Damages, supra note 131, at 1307 & n.58.
139. See D. Dobbs, supra note 1, § 3.9, at 214; Coffee, supra note 30, at 6; Owen I,
supra note 1, at 1305. But see Crane, supra note 1, at 40 (shareholders benefit no more
than bondholders or employees of corporations).
140. See Garrett, supra note 136, at 98; Williams, Corporate Accountability, in Com-
mentaries, supra note 53, at 517.
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porate action. 41 Finally, it is argued that legal liability is one of the risks
that shareholders accept when they buy stock. 142 However, when share-
holders invest they are already taking a financial gamble that manage-
ment is competent. A financially sophisticated investor can read the
company's annual report and study its past performance to determine
whether the investment contains a degree of risk that is acceptable to
him; he is unlikely to be able to determine whether a decision made by
the company may lead to a punitive damage award, 143 or whether the
company is likely to make such a decision in the future. Especially given
the inability of shareholders to effectively monitor corporate activities,
there seems to be no goal sought by punitive damages that is attained by
adding a legal gamble to shareholder risk. Additionally, many share-
holders do not make their investment choices themselves, but have them
made for them through mutual funds, pension funds and other invest-
ment vehicles; 1" they would thus be penalized for someone else's deci-
sion to buy.
2. Diffusion of Liability Beyond the Owners
The shareholders are not the only non-culpable parties likely to be
hurt. One of the arguments made by McNulty and its followers is that
insurers will pass on their liability to the public.145 This is likely to occur
with corporate liability regardless of insurance coverage.146 If the com-
pany is able to, it will pass the loss to consumers by raising prices.' 47 If it
cannot do this directly due to the demand curve of the market, it will
reduce output. 148 If the manufacturer has a large enough market share,
consumers will suffer indirectly, as reduced industry output will result in
higher prices. 149 Additionally, if the loss is sufficiently onerous that the
corporation goes bankrupt, or even merely suffers a significant financial
loss, it is likely that workers will be laid off or dismissed.1"' If the com-
141. Ellis, supra note 8, at 67 n.288.
142. See Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 817 (6th Cir. 1982);
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 291, 294 N.W.2d 437, 453-54 (1980).
143. An annual report is likely to contain information on the company's past perform-
ance and future goals. It is unlikely to contain in-depth information on the day-to-day
decisions that may lead to punitive damage liability.
144. H. Henn & J. Alexander, supra note 104, § 186, at 486; See Law, Arbitrage-The
Unavoidable Malaise, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1985, at D2, col. 3.
145. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
146. Long I, supra note 24, at 871-72.
147. Coffee, supra note 30, at 6; DuBois, supra note 2, at 349; Haskell, The Aircraft
Manufacturer's Liability for Design and Punitive Damages-The Insurance Policy and the
Public Policy, 40 J. Air L. & Com. 595, 612 (1974); Long I, supra note 24, at 872. A
competitive company, however, cannot necessarily pass on the loss. Acosta v. Honda
Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 836 (3d Cir. 1983); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d
260, 287-88, 294 N.W.2d 437, 452 (1980).
148. Calabresi, supra note 31, at 519.
149. Id.
150. Coffee, supra note 30, at 6; DuBois, supra note 2, at 349; Slain, supra note 81, at 6;
see In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 743, 746 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (liquidation would
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pany cuts down on production, suppliers to the company will suffer re-
duced sales."' If the company goes bankrupt, its creditors will be
injured. 5 2 Thus, one argument against allowing insurance of punitive
damages, that the wrongdoer should not be allowed to transfer his liabil-
ity to an innocent public, is not applicable in the corporate setting. The
nature of the American economy is such that any significant loss suffered
by a corporation will have a ripple effect. The severity of that effect will
depend on the size of the company and the size of the liability, but it will
be felt.
CONCLUSION
The issue of the insurability of punitive damages has traditionally been
decided without reference to whether the defendant is a corporation or
an individual. However, the policy reasons for prohibiting insurance-
deterring misconduct and punishing wrongdoers-are largely inapplica-
ble to the corporate defendant.
It is unlikely that noninsurability will deter corporate employees from
misconduct. Upper level managers have other pressures operating to de-
ter them. Because their egos are tied to the company's success and repu-
tation, they are likely to refrain from actions that could injure the
corporation. Additionally, the prospect of skyrocketing premiums or
cancelled policies should serve to deter them from wrongdoing. Lower
and middle level employees are unlikely to be moved by the prospect of
the corporation suffering a loss. Because corporate structure and operat-
ing practices make it difficult to trace employee misconduct to the
wrongdoer, employees have little reason to fear that they personally will
suffer reprisals.
Given the difficulty of tracing misconduct, the second goal of punitive
damages-punishment-will probably not be effectuated by prohibiting
insurance. Rather, the burden will fall primarily on the company's
shareholders, and will likely be spread beyond them to the corporation's
employees, consumers and creditors.
Additionally, allowing the award of punitive damages against a corpo-
ration presents the danger of abuse, the impact of which can be mitigated
by the ability of the company to insure. This danger has become more
profound in recent years with the increase in the frequency and amounts
of punitive damages awards. The danger of abuse is the result of several
eliminate needed jobs), appeal denied, 39 Bankr. 234 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). In a com-
pany town, the impact will spread beyond the employees. See Gruson, Village's 'Heart-
beat,'a Chemical Plant, Raises Fears, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1985, § 1, at 25, col. 1 (" 'It's
the heartbeat of the community,' said Perry Kelley, the owner of Mister Bill's, a conven-
ience store near the [chemical] plant. 'Without them everything comes to a dead halt. If
they closed, the town would dry up and blow away.' ").
151. DuBois, supra note 2, at 349; Slain, supra note 81, at 273.
152. Coffee, supra note 30, at 273; DuBois, supra note 2, at 349; Slain, supra note 81, at
273.
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factors: the broad discretion of the jury in determining punitive damage
awards, the hostility of juries to corporations, and the jury's lack of fi-
nancial sophistication in determining an appropriate award. Without the
protection of insurance, it is possible that the increase in punitive damage
awards could lead to the bankruptcy of corporations or to the discontinu-
ation of important products and services.
Alyssa Walden
